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ABSTRACT
Message passing by means of public key encryption is described in terms of doxastic dynamic logic. A secret
message from a to b can have as eect that b learns something new from a, but it can also cause a change in
the real world, when the contents of the message forces b to cease trusting a. As a tool for analysing secret
message passing (and much else besides) we develop a framework that allows changes of states conditioned
by beliefs about those states.
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1. Introduction
We present a model for describing how changes in the world get reected in multi-agent dox-
astic settings. One of the applications is the description of the results of message passing,
where messages can be public announcements, limited access announcements, or secret com-
munications. Message exchanges can result in belief updates, but also in changes of attitude
towards the sender. Our model can also deal with adjustments of agents to a changing reality,
collaborations between agents to achieve common goals, and much more besides.
In Section 2, we start with a short introduction to dierent applications of cryptographic
functions, followed by a discussion on how to interpret the reception of a message. In Section 3
we introduce a language of message passing, which we can use to describe the cryptographic
communication between agents that we are interested in. We also discuss the role of trust
between agents in the dierent interpretations of a message. In Sections 4 until 8 we give the
formal language of epistemic actions and change (which is an extension of the language of
message passing) and its semantics, together with examples. We also analyze several forms
of equivalences of actions, which may give a better understanding of actions, and which allow
us to abstract from a particular description of an action, as we are ultimately interested in its
result. In Section 9, we return to the case of message passing, and give our interpretation of
the several possible forms of messages, described in the introduced formal language. Finally
in Section 10 we state several sound reasoning principles in our framework.
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We assume familiarity with a Kripke-style semantics for epistemic logic, and we will apply
an analogous semantics for action expressions, building on the work of Baltag et al. [1, 2].
A general setting for our research is given in [6]. Our proposal is in the tradition of dynamic
epistemic logic; see Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [7] for an epistemic logic of information up-
dates in terms of non-wellfounded set theory. In Moss 1999 it was pointed out that there is
no need for phrasing logics of announcements in terms of hypersets, but that Kripke models
will do nicely [11]. Baltag, Moss, and Solecki [2] show how to do epistemic updates with
standard Kripke models. Epistemic perspectives on change in the real world are still very
much the province of philosophy: see, e.g., Von Wright [15], but also Shoham [14].
2. Using Encryption for Secrecy and Authentication
In this section we discuss what cryptographic methods can be used in communication, and
in what way they ensure secrecy or authentication.
Encryption Methods To start with, here is an outline of private key encryption. In this
method, keyK is usually shared by (i.e. only known to) two (or more) agents. The encryption
function
encr :: Key Message  ! Message
and the decryption function
decr :: Key Message  ! Message
are commonly known, and relate as expected: for each message the decryption of an en-
cryption with a certain key of a message, gives back the original message again, that is,
decrK(encrKM) = M . The idea is that without the key K, it is impossible | or more
commonly: infeasible | to recover message M from the encrypted encrKM .
In public key encryption, on which we will focus here, key K is public, but its inverse K
 1
is kept private. The idea is that it is computationally infeasible to compute K
 1
from K, and
that an encrypted message cannot be deciphered without possessing the inverse key. When
a key K is viewed as a function, it has the type
K :: Message  ! Message;
and its inverse has the type
K
 1
:: Message  ! Message:
If a uses a key K
b
that is made public by b to encode a message M , then b, who is the sole
owner of K
 1
b
, will be able to decipher it with K
 1
b
(K
b
M) =M .
Furthermore, if we assume that the private key K
 1
is not only the left-inverse, but also
the right-inverse of K, it can be used for signing messages. When the owner b of public key
K
b
applies her private key K
 1
b
to a message M , the resulting K
 1
b
M can in principle be
decoded by everyone, with the publicly known key K
b
, since K
b
(K
 1
b
M) = M , but it can
only have been created by someone possessing the secret key K
 1
b
, in this case assumedly b
herself. In this way the public-private key pair can be used for ensuring the destined receiver
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to the sender, and ensuring the sender to the receiver. In practice, one would consider a
tuple (M; b;K
 1
b
M) as a complete signed message, which consists of the plain message, the
sender and the signed message itself, the latter treated as a proof of the rst two, which can
be checked by everyone. For simplicity reasons, we will denote a signed message here only
by K
 1
b
M .
Linking Agents to Keys If we want to model message passing by public key encryption with
dynamic doxastic logic, we may assume that it is public knowledge that a certain key K
b
belongs to b. We will not get into details here as to how such situation can be established; in
practice, the use of a trusted key server (or authentication server) often solves this problem.
The idea is that the key server is trusted on statements which link identities to keys, for
example by handing out keys to agents which are (in another way) authenticated to it and by
(one time) creating (sending around) a signed message (certicate) stating this. Nevertheless,
considering that keys may get lost or get stolen, the problem remains that one needs external
(non-cryptographic) means for relating the possession of a key to identication of agents. In
this paper, we assume the setting as already given.
So the answer to the question `Can you tell who wrote a given signed message?' seems to
be: you can tell which key was used to encode it, and you can conclude that the agent that
signed it must possess the key. Only to the extent that key is securely linked to an agent,
you can securely identify the author of a signed message.
In principle, the question of knowing the key is separate from the question of knowing the
possessors of it, but for our analysis we simplify by keeping the possessors of a key xed, and
assuming the identity of the possessor(s) to be common knowledge.
Linking Messages to Senders Suppose b receives a secret message signed by a. The message
is encoded with b's public key, and it contains a message signed by a (using a's secret key),
so it has form K
b
(K
 1
a
M). Nothing would prevent b from resending the signed message of a
to, say, c. All b has to do is decode K
b
(K
 1
a
M) by means of
K
 1
b
K
b
(K
 1
a
M) = K
 1
a
M
and then form and send a message K
c
(K
 1
a
M) to c. This suggests to c that a sent her a
message, as it contains no trace of the resending by b. Suppose the message says
Please meet me tomorrow at 8 p.m. in the lobby of Hotel de l'Europe.
Signed: a.
Then b could fool c into a surprise meeting with a. This can be prevented by means of
mentioning the recipient in an encoded message: a should be careful to word his message as:
Dear b,
Please meet me tomorrow at 8 p.m. in the lobby of Hotel de l'Europe.
Signed: a.
In that case, c will understand that the message is not meant for her.
Even in the very simple set-up that we will assume below this distinction is relevant.
Suppose c thinks that the message M is nonsense (we will make this more precise later), then
receiving K
c
(K
 1
a
M) | even if sent by b | will make c start to distrust a, not b.
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In other words, signing messages gives security about authors of messages (in a broad
sense), and not necessarily about senders. In what sense one is responsible for messages that
are passed on by others remains a part of discussion and of interpretation. In our approach
we maintain responsibility for the original authors. In the above example: c justly starts to
distrust a.
3. A Language for Passing Secrets
In this section we introduce a language for messages and the reasoning about the broadcasting
of them. We also discuss the representation of trust and trustwortiness in that language.
Building Messages The simplest situation to analyze seems to be the case where there
is a nite number of agents a; b; c; : : : , and it is common knowledge that they have public
keys K
a
;K
b
;K
c
; : : : Let us assume further that the agents exchange messages consisting of
formulas, which in fact are invitations to learn something, and to accept the formula as true.
We will make this more specic as we go along. For now, assume that sending a message can
be represented with an expression of category Message.
As a starting point, we will rst look at the event of a message passing by, without worrying
about who actually performed this action, i.e. who triggered this event. Also, we assume a
broadcasting network, so that all agents receive the (total) message, and an addressee need
not be specied.
All messages may contain signatures, but messages need not be signed. All messages may
be encrypted with someone's public key, so that other agents cannot read it. As we assume
that possessors of keys are xed, and we only describe public key cryptography, we can
identify the notion of \encrypting with key K" with \encrypting for agent a", for a the (sole)
possessor of K. Hence we do not need a special type of keys in our language here, and we
can use names of agents instead of keys, to specify the encryption or signing function. Under
these assumptions we can dene messages recursively either as a formula (F
Message
), or a
signed or encrypted message, as follows:
Agent ::= a j b j c j   
F
Message
::= p j q j   
j F
Message
^ F
Message
j :F
Message
Message ::= F
Message
j Encr
Agent
Message
j Sign
Agent
Message
j Sign
Agent
Agent
Message
Here Encr
a
m can be read as message m encrypted for a, i.e. with a's public key. Similarly,
Sign
b
m is to be read as message m signed by b, that is, b's private key is applied to message
m to sign it. Sign
a
b
m means: message m, addressed to a, and signed by b, that is: message
m identies a as the intended recipient, and b's private key is used to sign it.
Meaning and Representation of Trust Trust between agents can be modeled in a number
of ways. One of the simplest is to take trustworthiness of an agent a as a basic property Ta.
We could then model `b has complete trust in a' as 2
b
Ta (i.e. `b believes a is trustworthy'),
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and `b has some trust in a' as 3
b
Ta (`b considers it possible that a is trustworthy'). However,
trustworthiness is not necessarily an intrinsic property, but rather something that could be
used in a calculated way. The main diÆculty of this analysis is that from an operational
viewpoint, where trust is something which an agent a deserves in view of his behaviour vis-
a-vis b, trust is more plausibly viewed as a relation. After all, it is very well possible that
I have every reason to trust someone whom you have every reason to distrust. My bridge
partner is trustworthy for me, but will try to help me in misleading our opponents.
Alternatively, we could consider not trustworthiness, but trustfulness as a basic property
of an agent. In that case, agents could be either trustful or suspicious to all other agents.
Again, this does not seem to be a subtle enough description of reality. If one agent shows
untrustworthy behaviour, it does not mean that all others also turned into cheaters. At the
same time when I fully trust someone, I could fully distrust someone else.
We therefore consider trust as a relation between agents, and we analyze `a has complete
trust in b' as: 2
a
Trustab, to be paraphrased as `a knows that b has always in the past behaved
in a trustworthy way towards a', or `a knows that b has never lied to him'.
It is diÆcult to think about a distinction between Trustab and 2
a
Trustab. Is it desirable
that agents trust someone but (falsely) believe they do not? Or the other way around: could
agents believe the trust, but in fact they do not? Exactly because trust is a property of their
own internal structure or behaviour, one would expect agents not to be uncertain about their
trust and distrust | let alone to be misled. Some knowledge rather than belief about trust
seems more appropriate. But replacing in our approach beliefs by knowledge for all facts of
the world is not desirable at all: when an encrypted message is being passed, agents who
cannot read it could, in our simplied system, treat it as if nothing has happened. So, in fact,
when considering actions as action structures, as we will do in this paper, the accessibility
relations within those action structures are not always reexive: in some cases agents have
wrong beliefs about the action that is happening, and they may, as a result, acquire wrong
beliefs about the world, even if all their beliefs were right beforehand.
In this paper we will therefore assume a special property only for trust, which works as
a knowledge axiom for trust and distrust, but only for the agent whose trust is at stake. In
fact, the axiom gives a stronger property than knowledge: it guarantees certainty about an
agent's own trust or distrust. An agent either knows he trusts another agent, or he knows he
distrusts, but cannot be uncertain. In other words, when formulated as an axiom, we have
for all agents a and b:
` (Trustab $ 2
a
Trustab) ^ (:Trustab $ 2
a
:Trustab)
Together with the belief assumptions in general, which we will get back to in Section 9, this
should give us an intuitive property of trust: the only proposition which truth value the
agent is sure of. We will prove that after the sending of messages (and their processing), as
modelled in this paper, this property still holds.
Note that agents do not need to know or be sure of other agents' trust. Question: does
the fact that a ceases to trust b entail that b should be aware of this fact? Answer: not
necessarily. Think of cases where my telling you a silly story causes you to not take me
seriously anymore, without me being aware that anything is amiss.
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A Language for Message Passing We need belief operators for every agent, and action
modalities for every action, so we dene the more extensive logical language (where L
MP
stands for the language of message passing) as follows:
Prop ::= p j q j    j TrustAgentAgent
L
MP
::= Prop j :L
MP
j L
MP
^ L
MP
j 2
Agent
L
MP
j 2

P(Agent)
L
MP
j [Message]L
MP
We treat assertions about which agent trusts which other agent as basic propositions, as we
discussed above. Also, we write instances of the knowledge modalities as usual: 2
a
;2

fa;c;dg
 .
Furthermore, the expression [m] is read as: after broadcasting message m,  holds. We will
extend the language L
MP
to the general language of dynamic doxastic logic (which includes
more general actions) in Section 5.
4. Examples
Before we introduce our formal apparatus, we will introduce our approach by means of some,
hopefully illuminating, examples.
Suppose there is a single agent a who rightly believes that q is true, but does not know
whether p is the case or not, while in fact p is true. We can picture this as the following
Kripke-style doxastic state (with a `+' pointing at the actual world):
p; q
+
w
0
:p; q
w
1
-
a
]
a

a
That is, a cannot distinguish between worlds w
0
and w
1
: in either one a considers both w
0
and w
1
possible.
Consider now the change of the world where q changes to false, but the agent is unaware of
the change. We will picture this action as a Kripke model, in the same style as the doxastic
model above: with a + pointing at the happening that actually takes place, and
a
 ! arrows
indicating what agent a thinks (or: considers possible) that takes place. This yields the
following picture:
q :=0
+
k
0
Skip
k
1
-
a
]
a
So the actual action is that q is set to false, while a considers it only possible that nothing
(Skip) is happening.
The result of updating the doxastic model with this epistemic action is a model where q
has been set to false in the actual world (resulting in a new actual world w
2
), while the only
two worlds a considers possible (and still cannot distinguish) are the two `old' worlds of the
earlier model, where nothing has changed:
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p;:q
+
w
2
p; q
w
0
:p; q
w
1
6
?
a
-
a
j
a
]
a
]
a
Indeed, from a's point of view nothing has happened, while in fact a change of facts took
place.
Below, we will formally introduce a language where action expressions are built from basic
commands by means of + (choice), Æ (sequencing),
a
(a-suspicion), and  recursion. An
action expression in this language that denotes the action structure of the example, is q :=
0 + (x:(Skip+ x
a
))
a
. The  operator represents here the self reference in the a-loop at the
Skip-action, and will be explained below.
Our framework is rich enough to model dispositions to act in dierent ways depending on
what one believes. Here is Othello's disposition (with o for Othello, :f for `Desdemona is
unfaithful' and k for `Othello kills Desdemona'):
If 2
o
:f Then k := 1Else Skip:
If Othello believes Desdemona is unfaithful to him he will kill her, otherwise he will do nothing.
This is not yet truly dramatic. The following action expression captures Shakespeare's plot
more fully:
x:(If 2
o
:f Then k := 1Else Skip) + x
i
+ (y:y
o
+ y
i
)
o
:
Or, in a picture:
If 2
o
:f Then k := 1Else Skip
+
]
i
?
o
Skip
K
i,o
Iago is aware of Othello's disposition, but Othello himself is not. Note that Iago knows
that Othello is not aware of that, but Othello does not suspect this. Even Iago's knowledge
that Othello is mistaken is covered by this action picture. We leave it to the reader to extend
the action expression with Othello's trust in Iago.
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5. Epistemic Actions and Actions on the Real World
Doxastic models Like in the semantics of [1], we dene doxastic models as tuples W =
(W; ( !
W
a
)
a2Agent
; V
W
) where W denotes the (nite) set of worlds,  !
W
a
(usually we leave
out the superscript W ) denotes the accessibility relations for each agent and V
W
:: W  !
P(Prop) is a valuation function. Recall our assumption that for any pair of agents a; b the
proposition Trustab is in Prop. In the coming sections, we will not require any additional
properties on models and actions, but we will introduce them in our analysis of the sending
of messages in Section 9.
Doxastic states An doxastic state (or a pointed model) is now a pair s = (W; w) of an
doxastic model and a designated world (the \actual world"). We read p 2 V
W
(w) as \p is
true in world w". If
s = ((W; ( !
W
a
)
a2Agent
; V
W
); w)
is a state, we use V
s
for V
W
(w), i.e., V
s
is the valuation of the actual world of the state. We
use State to refer to the set of states.
Language of Dynamic Doxastic Logic It is convenient to broaden our scope rst, before
focusing on encoded message passing as example actions. We extend the language L
MP
(from
Section 3) to the general action language L, as follows:
L ::= Prop j :L j L
1
^ L
2
j 2
Agent
L j 2

P(Agent)
L j [Action]L
The only dierence with the language L
MP
is the last line, where we allow expressions of the
form [], where  is an action (not just a message). We will describe in Section 9 how the
messages relate to these general actions; they are more easily understood in terms of general
actions. The general action type Action will be dened below.
Here are some standard abbreviations:
? is shorthand for p ^ :p.
> is shorthand for :?.
A Language of Basic Commands For actions, we will allow not only doxastic actions (which
inuence the beliefs of agents), but also actions which change the truth values of facts (propo-
sition letters) of the actual world. We need that, as we have modelled trust by the propo-
sitional construct Trustab, and we want to be able to change trust into distrust, if desired.
(In Section 3 we discussed why we take a propositional construct (as \fact" in every world
of the model) for the binary trust relation.) To specify actions on the real world, we use the
following command language:
Bool ::= 0 j 1
Assign ::= Prop := Bool
Assigns ::= fAssign; : : : ;Assigng
Com ::= If LThen ComElse Com j Assigns
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Assignments are expressions of the form p := 0 or p := 1, and sets of assignments (Assigns) are
interpreted as simultaneous assignments. Intuitively, If Then fp := 1; q := 1; r := 0gElse fg
means that in states where  is true, the facts about p; q; r; in the real world are simultaneously
changed into true, true, false; in states where  is not true, nothing will be changed. Note
that setting p to the value determined by  is done by means of the command
If Then p := 1Else p := 0:
A set of assignments fA
1
; : : : ; A
n
g is consistent if it does not contain any contradictory
pairs p := 0; p := 1. We dene for every list of assignments A the sets A
+
and A
 
of
proposition letters as follows:
A
+
:= fp j p := 1 2 Ag
A
 
:= fp j p := 0 2 Ag
In other words, A is inconsistent if A
+
\A
 
6= ;. Inconsistent assignment sets are interpreted
to fail, so we treat them all equal. We will also write (A
+
; A
 
) to denote A.
Here are some useful abbreviations:
Skip is shorthand for the command fg.
Fail is shorthand for the command fp := 1; p := 0g (or in fact, any other inconsistent assign-
ment list).
? is shorthand for the command If Then Skip Else Fail.
This command language allows us to change propositional valuations and the Trust rela-
tion, either unconditionally or subject to certain conditions, and to fail, subject to certain
conditions.
A Lattice of Assignment Sets Notice that, if we identify all inconsistent assignment lists
with each other (which we did in the denition of Fail), Assigns is a complete lattice under
the ordering v, dened as A v B i either B = Fail or both A
+
 B
+
and A
 
 B
 
(see Davey and Priestley [5]). Let t be the join operation in this lattice. Then we have:
AtB = (A
+
[B
+
; A
 
[B
 
), and indeed Fail is the top of this lattice and Skip the bottom:
Skip v A v Fail for all A. Hence the following laws also hold: A t Fail = Fail tA = Fail and
A t Skip = Skip tA = A.
A Language of Action Expressions Changes in the real world, as described by the above
command language, can be viewed from dierent perspectives. Not everyone may be aware
of a change, e.g., or some agents may even think that a dierent change is occurring than
the actual change. The notion of an action (expression) takes all this into account, for in
action expressions actions can appear under `suspicion relations' (to use a phrase coined by
Alexandru Baltag). The action expressions of our language are given by:
Action ::= Com j x
a
j Action
a
j Action
1
+ Action
2
j Action
1
Æ Action
2
j x  Action
In words, an action expression in the rst place be a bare command, as dened above. It can
also be a variable x (referring to an action) or an action expression itself under suspicion of an
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agent a, which means that a considers x or the action as possibly happening. This suspicion
of a is an action in itself that is happening. An action can also be a parallel composition of
two actions 
1
and 
2
, denoted by 
1
+ 
2
. Although `+' as a symbol for parallellism may
be confusing (traditionally it is used for choice), we chose to keep the notation as introduced
by Baltag et al.; the intuition is that the parallel composition of two suspicions by the same
agent behaves like a choice: 
a
+ 
a
means that agent a considers either  or  possibly
happening. Furthermore, an action can consist of a sequential composition 
1
Æ 
2
of two
actions 
1
and 
2
(with the traditional interpretation). Finally, an action can have the form
x:, where  is again an action expression. This expression is interpreted as  itself, in
which occurring variables x refer back to the full expression.
Note that the only operator that can be applied directly on a variable is the suspicion
operator (in x
a
); which means that the only circularity we are interested in is the circular
awareness of actions happening. This will correspond to circular arrows in the action models
we will introduce in Section 6 | pictures of which we have seen in Section 4. We will see
that it is intuitive to think of the x operator as a place holder: x gives name x to the
current action (sub) expression, and if within that expression the name x is referred to (like
in x
a
), it means that there will be suspicion (by a) about it. We have seen in Section 4 how
this corresponds to a picture view of actions.
Nota bene: An action is closed if every variable occurrence x in it is in the scope of a x
operator. In this paper, we mean by `action expression' a closed action expression.
Action Models and Action Structures Using the bare commands as building blocks for our
semantics, we now dene action models as tuples K = (K; ( !
K
a
)
a2Agent
; C
K
), where K is a
set of action tokens,  !
K
a
(again, we usually leave out superscriptK) denotes the accessibility
relation for each agent, and C
K
:: K  ! Com is a function which maps every action token
to a command. We will call such a function a change function, as it represents the dierent
atomic changes that may be happening or suspected to happen during the action.
Note the similarities between doxastic models and action models: both have a graph struc-
ture, where edges are labelled by agents, and the nodes also have a `value' given by the
valuation function (doxastic models) or the change function (action models).
Analogous to a pointed model, a pointed action model, or action structure, is now a pair
 = (K; k
0
) of an action model and a designated action token (the \actual action"). We use
ActionStructure to refer to the set of action structures. We will use ; ; : : : to refer both
to action expressions and to action structures; we will see that there is a correspondence
between the two types, and from the context it will be clear which of the two is used.
Lifting the Inner Accessibility Relations and Functions We dene the relation  !
a
between
pointed models (or action structures) as meaning that the underlying models coincide and the
tops (designated worlds or action tokens) are related according to the accessibility relation
within the underlying model (or action structure). Hence, for s = (W; w) and s
0
= (W
0
; w
0
),
s  !
a
s
0
iW =W
0
and w  !
a
w
0
; the relation   !
a

0
is dened analogously. Similarly,
we write V
s
, or sometimes V (s), for the valuation in the top world of state s, and C

or C()
for the command in the top action of pointed action structure .
6. Semantics 11
6. Semantics
We will rst give a general semantics of the doxastic action logic, together with a denition of
the update function for the actions as dened above. In Section 9 we show how the sending
of a message m can be captured in such a pointed action structure.
Truth in a Doxastic State The truth relation j= between an doxastic state
s = ((W; ( !
W
a
)
a2Agent
; V
W
); w)
and a formula  2 L is dened as follows (recursively over the structure of ):
s j= p := p 2 V
s
s j= : := s 6j= 
s j=  ^  := s j=  and s j=  
s j= 2
a
 := s
0
j=  for all s
0
with s  !
a
s
0
s j= 2

A
 := s
0
j=  for all s
0
with s  !

A
s
0
s j= [] := s
0
j=  for all s
0
with s
0
= s:[[]]
Note that formulas of the form Trustab are treated as propositions, as we assume that
fTrustab j a; b 2 Agentg  Prop.
The function `[[:]]' (as in `[[]]') that maps action expressions to actions structures and the
update function `:' (as in `s:[[]]') that updates states with action structures will be given
below. We will also dene a function Expr which does the opposite of `[[:]]': it gives for each
given (nite) action model a corresponding action expression.
Applying a Command to a State For commands C, we dene hhCii(s) as the new valuation in
the top world of s after command C has been executed. As valuations are sets of proposition
letters, the function hh:ii is of type hh:ii :: Com  ! (State  ! P(Prop)), taking a command
and a state, and returning a valuation. We dene this function only for states where the
command does not fail. We state the denition recursively to commands (A refers to an
assignment list and C
1
; C
2
to any command):
hhIf ThenC
1
ElseC
2
ii(s) :=

hhC
1
ii(s) if s j= 
hhC
2
ii(s) otherwise
hhAii(s) := (V
s
[A
+
) n A
 
if A consistent
Note that hhFailii(s) is undened for every state s.
Operations on Action Structures Next, we associate an action structure with every closed
action. This denition is an extension of the denition in [1]. First, we dene the semantic
operations
a
; and  on action structures which correspond with the syntactic operations
a
, + and Æ that construct action expressions. In order to dene them, we also need a function
Expr which gives an action expression for each nite action structure.
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Operations on Action Structures: Suspicion The operation
a
(with a 2 Agent) gives for
a given action structure (K; k
0
) a new action structure (K; k
0
)
a
, which consists of a new
top node from which only one arrow leaves: an a-arrow pointing to the top k
0
the initial
structure (K; k
0
). The idea is that it reects that a suspects the given structure. It is dened
as follows:
((K; (!
b
)
b2Agent
; C); k
0
)
a
:= ((K
0
; (!
0
b
)
b2Agent
; C
0
); k
0
0
);
where
 K
0
= K [ fng, with n new,
 (!
0
b
)
b2Agent
= (!
b
)
b2Agent
[ fn!
a
k
0
g,
 C
0
given by: C
0
(k) = C(k) for k 2 K, C(n) = Skip,
 k
0
0
= n.
Operations on Action Structures: Parallel Composition The operation  returns for two
action structures their parallel composition: an action structure which top gives a parallel
\merge" of the two given top tokens, and which unites the arrows of the given tops. It is
dened as follows:
((K; (!
b
)
b2Agent
; C); k
0
)((K
0
; (!
0
b
)
b2Agent
; C
0
); k
0
0
) := ((K
00
; (!
00
b
)
b2Agent
; C
00
); k
00
0
);
where
 K
00
is the direct (disjoint) sum of K;K
0
and fng, with n new,
 (!
00
b
)
b2Agent
= (!
b
)
b2Agent
[ (!
0
b
)
b2Agent
[ fn!
00
b
k j k
0
!
b
k or k
0
0
!
0
b
kg.
 C
00
is given by:
{ C
00
(k) = C(k) for k 2 K,
{ C
00
(k) = C
0
(k) for k 2 K
0
,
{ C
00
(n) = C(k
0
) k C
0
(k
0
0
), with k as given below.
 k
00
0
= n.
In the denition we use a parallel composition on commands, which we dene as follows:
k :: Com Com  ! Com
A
1
k A
2
:= A
1
tA
2
(If ThenC
1
ElseC
2
) k C
3
:= If Then (C
1
k C
3
)Else (C
2
k C
3
)
C
1
k C
2
:= C
2
k C
1
Recall the denition of t as we have dened above: A
1
tA
2
= (A
+
1
tA
+
2
; A
 
1
tA
 
2
). Note
that this indeed denes the function, as evaluation order does not matter. It is easy to see
that k is commutative, associative and idempotent.
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Operations on Action Structures: Sequential Composition The operation  returns the
sequential composition of two given action structures. The action tokens consist of sequential
compositions of pairs of action tokens from the two given structures, and the idea is that a
sequential composition of suspicions by an agent is a suspicion by that agent of the sequential
composition (\if b rst thinks that  may be happening, and afterwards b thinks that  may
be happening, then in fact b thinks that  followed by  may be happening"). The operation
is dened as follows:
((K; (!
b
)
b2Agent
; C); k
0
)((K
0
; (!
0
b
)
b2Agent
; C
0
); k
0
0
) := ((K
00
; (!
00
b
)
b2Agent
; C
00
); k
00
0
);
where
 K
00
= f(k; k
0
) j k 2 K; k
0
2 K
0
g,
 (!
00
b
)
b2Agent
given by (k
1
; k
0
1
)!
00
b
(k
2
; k
0
2
) i k
1
!
b
k
2
and k
0
1
!
0
b
k
0
2
.
 C
00
is given by: C
00
(k; k
0
) = Expr(K; k);C
0
(k
0
), with the functions Expr and `;' as given
below.
 k
00
0
= (k
0
; k
0
0
).
In the denition we use a kind of sequential composition `;' on pairs of action structures
and commands, which we dene as follows:
; :: Action Com  ! Com
; (If ThenC
1
ElseC
2
) := If []Then (;C
1
)Else (;C
2
)
A
1
;A
2
:= (A
+
2
[ (A
+
1
n A
 
2
); A
 
2
[ (A
 
1
n A
+
2
))
(If ThenC
1
ElseC
2
);A := If Then (C
1
;A)Else (C
2
;A)
;A := topcomm();A (for  62 Com)
Here, topcomm is a function which gives the command which is applied to the actual world,
i.e. the command of the top action token, It is dened mutually with the above `;', as follows:
topcomm :: Action  ! Com
topcomm(C) := C
topcomm(
a
) := Skip
topcomm(+ ) := topcomm() k topcomm()
topcomm( Æ ) := ; topcomm()
topcomm(x:(x)) := topcomm((x:(x)))
For the topcomm of a  expression x:(x) we recall that a variable x can only occur in
(x) under suspicion of some agent a. As topcomm of a suspicion is Skip, it is clear that the
denition is not circular.
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We also use a function Expr, which gives a corresponding action expression for every nite
action structure. It is dened as follows:
Expr :: ActionStructure  ! Action
Expr(K; k
0
) := buildexpr k
0
;
where
buildexpr k V :=

x
k
if k 2 V
x
k
:C
K
(k) +
P
a2Agent
P
k
0
2K;k !
a
k
0
(buildexpr k
0
(V [ fkg))
a
otherwise
This denition can be read as follows: for every action token k we introduce a subexpression
preceded by a  operator (x
k
). We introduce an a-suspicion for every a 2 Agent and
k  !
a
k
0
, either to x
a
k
0
(if we are already in the scope of x
k
0
), or to a more complicated
subexpression which introduces x
k
0
and describes the token ((x
k
0
:C
K
(k) + : : : )
a
). For an
example we refer to the Othello-example of Section 4, in which, if we call the two action
tokens k
0
and k
1
, x should be read as x
k
0
and y as x
k
1
. In fact, the above denition of
buildexpr introduces unnecessary  operators (also for action tokens which do not have a
self-reference in their subexpression), but we use this denition for readability and simplicity
reasons.
Interpretation of Action Expressions The action structure associated with an action ex-
pression  is denoted by [[]], and is dened as follows:
[[ ]] :: Action  ! ActionStructure
[[Com]] := ((fng; ;; f(n;Com)g); n)
[[Action
a
]] := [[Action]]
a
[[Action
1
+ Action
2
]] := [[Action
1
]][[Action
2
]]
[[Action
1
Æ Action
2
]] := [[Action
1
]][[Action
2
]]
[[x:Action(x)]] := [[Action(x:Action(x))]]:
Note that in the denition of [[Com]] we use n for a new name of an action token. The
action structure becomes then one node with that name n, an empty accessibility relation,
and a function (here represented as a tuple) which maps n to the command it represents. The
top node is the only node n. The operators for suspicion, parallel and sequential composition
we have discussed above. The action structure for a  expression is dened as the action
structure of the once \unfolded"  expression. So, the smallest action structure satisfying
the expression x:x
a
is, as expected, the structure with one action token that has Skip as a
command, and one a-arrow from the token to itself. (See [10] for more on the -calculus.)
Updating Doxastic States With Action Structures Finally, we dene the update function,
which maps a state and an action structure to the state \after the action". Given a state
s = (W; w
0
), with W = (W; ( !
W
a
)
a2Agent
; V
W
), and given an action model  = (K; k
0
)
with K = (K; ( !
K
a
)
a2Agent
; C
K
), we say that s survives , if C
K
(k
0
)(s) is dened. If s
survives , then we dene the update s: of s by  as the state
s: := ((W:K; ( !
W:K
a
)
a2Agent
; V
W:K
); w
0
:k
0
);
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where
 W:K := f(w; k) j w 2W;k 2 K; hhC
K
(k)ii(W; w) is denedg
 w
0
:k
0
:= (w
0
; k
0
)
 (w; k)  !
W:K
a
(w
0
; k
0
) i both w  !
W
a
w
0
and k  !
K
a
k
0
for (w; k); (w
0
; k
0
) 2W:K
 V
W:K
(w; k) := hhC
K
(k)ii(W; w).
For s and  such that s does not survive , the update s: remains undened.
7. Further Examples
For further illustration, here are some examples of actions involving tests and conditionals.
Suppose we want to express the following conditional action: if p then p is reset to 0, and
otherwise p is reset to 1, while a is aware of this conditional action happening, but b thinks
that nothing is happening. Moreover, a realizes what b believes. This can now be represented
by the expression:
x:(If pThen p := 0Else p := 1) + x
a
+ (y:Skip+ y
a
+ y
b
)
b
This expression can be interpreted as follows: the rst  operator introduces a placeholder
(x) for the outermost (top) action, in which the if-then-else takes place, while at the same
time (connected with `+') a is aware of that (x
a
) and b suspects something else taking place:
y:Skip+ y
a
+ y
b
. This latter subexpression indicates an action with placeholder y (via y)
where nothing happens (Skip), while a and b are simultaneously aware of that (y
a
+ y
b
). In
other words, pictorially we can represent this action as follows:
If pThen p := 0Else p := 1
+
]
a
?
b
Skip
K
a,b
Note that we cannot write the whole expression as a kind of if-then-else, as our if-then-else
operator (used in the subexpression) is only dened on commands, not on general action
expressions. Also, the maybe familiar construction p? Æ  + :p? Æ  from other formalisms
does not act as an if-then-else in our language: `+' is not a choice operator, but a parallel
composition. Hence p? failing in states where :p holds, while :p? fails in states where p
holds, results in an action that always fails (p? + :p? = Fail).
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Another interesting expression is the following:
x:If pThen p := 0Else p := 1 + x
a
+ (y:(p? + y
a
+ y
b
))
b
+ (y:(:p? + y
a
+ y
b
))
b
In a picture, this is:
If pThen p := 0Else p := 1
+
]
a
	
b
R
b
p?
K
ab
:p?
K
ab
Although exactly one of b's suspected actions (either p? or :p?) will succeed in each of b's
possible worlds, the a; b-labelled arrows aect the worlds accessible from them. So, b learns
p or :p, that is, afterwards she will know that she (together with a) knows either p or :p,
which she did not necessarily know beforehand. That means that either learning p or learning
:p is, without extra conditions, not the same as learning (p _ :p).
8. State and Action Bisimulations
Expressions of L and action expression are obviously used to describe dierent things, states
and changes of state, but they also dier in another important way. Where the formulas of L
that hold in a state `dene' that state up to bisimilarity, an action expression describes much
more precisely the shape of the corresponding action structure. Furthermore, one action
expression \fully" describes the action, while one single L-formula that holds in a state does
not necessarily (often possibly) describe all formulas holding in that state. E.g. \p_ q" does
not specify if only p, q or p ^ q hold | and it does not mention if r or 2
a
p holds.
In this section we dene a bisimulation relation on states, and, analogously to that, a
bisimulation relation on actions. We will see that the bisimilarity of two actions is a suÆcient,
but not necessary condition on them having the same eects on states. Furthermore, we
dene another bisimulation relation on pairs of actions and states which does correspond to
the eect of an action.
Bisimulation is a key notion in both modal logic and process theory [9, 13]. Bisimulations
were introduced in modal logic under the name `p-relations' in Van Benthem's dissertation,
dating from 1976 [3]. The bisimulation notion was introduced in computer science around
1980, where the classical reference is Park 1981 [12]. For a catalogue of classical results about
bisimulation, the reader is referred to the work of Hennesy and Milner [8].
Denition 1 Two states s
1
; s
2
are bisimilar (notation: s
1
 s
2
) i
 V
s
1
= V
s
2
;
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 for all t
1
such that s
1
 !
a
t
1
for some a, there is a t
2
such that s
2
 !
a
t
2
and t
1
 t
2
;
 and vice versa.
The denition of states that two states s
1
; s
2
are bisimilar if they (i.e. their top worlds)
have the same valuation (V
s
1
= V
s
2
), and for every a-arrow s
1
 !
a
t
1
from the top to some
world in the underlying model of s
1
there is an a-arrow s
2
 !
a
t
2
from the top to a world in
s
2
for which those two worlds t
1
; t
2
are, together with their underlying models, again bisimilar
states (t
1
 t
2
); and vice versa: for every s
2
 !
a
t
2
we can also nd such a s
1
 !
a
t
1
.
We will dene the notion of bisimilarity for actions completely analogous to the one for
states, where the change functions take the role of the valuations. However, rather than
requiring equality of commands, we will use a notion of equivalence of commands, dened as
follows, using the denition of applying a command to a state from Section 6:
Denition 2 Two commands C;C
0
are equivalent (notation: C  C
0
) if for all states s,
hhCii(s) = hhC
0
ii(s).
In fact, we say that two commands are equivalent if they act the same, i.e. return the same
valuation, on every state s. For example, If pThen q := 0Else q := 0 is equivalent to q := 0,
and If True Then Skip Else Fail is equivalent to Skip. (Note that it is suÆcient to require this
for all bisimilation classes [s].)
Now we dene bisimilarity of action structures analogous to bisimilarity of states.
Denition 3 Two action structures 
1
; 
2
are bisimilar (notation: 
1
 
2
) i
 C

1
 C

2
;
 for all 
1
such that 
1
 !
a

1
for some a, there is a 
2
such that 
2
 !
a

2
and

1
 
2
;
 and vice versa.
Note that, unlike the process algebra notion of bisimulation, the action bisimulation does
not refer to a process, but to a single action that has an internal knowledge structure. Follow-
ing of the arrows according to this denition represents, like in the case of state bisimulations,
the comparing of possibilities (actions, worlds), rather than looking ahead in the process. In
process algebra, s  !
a
t would refer to a process step (a, which takes s to t), whereas in our
framework s  !
a
t or   !
a
 refer to possibility and suspicion relations.
Lemma 4 For states s; s
0
and action structures ; 
0
we have: if s  s
0
and   
0
, and if
s: is dened, then s
0
:
0
is also dened, and s:  s
0
:
0
.
Proof Let s
1
 s
2
and 
1
 
2
be given, with s
i
:= (W
i
; w
i
) and 
i
:= (K
i
; k
i
). Suppose
that s
1
:
1
is dened. Because of the given bisimilarities, we know that C

1
 C

2
, which are
commands that respect bisimilarity. So if they are dened on a state, then they are dened
on a bisimilar state as well, so s
0
:
0
is dened. Also, the changes they return for each actual
world are equal. In other words: the valuation hhC

1
ii(s
1
) equals hhC

2
ii(s
1
), this equals again
8. State and Action Bisimulations 18
hhC

2
ii(s
2
). So (see denition update), V
(s
1
:
1
)
= V
(s
2
:
2
)
. This proves the rst condition of
bisimilarity of s
1
:
1
and s
2
:
2
.
To prove the second part, we use the bisimulation game, and show that Duplicator has a
winning strategy. Suppose Spoiler chooses u
1
with s
1
:
1
 !
a
u
1
for some a. First note that
the underlying models of s
1
:
1
and u
1
are the same, they only may dier in the top world.
Denote the top world of u
1
by (w
1
; k
1
). Now write t
1
for the state with the same underlying
model as s
1
and top world w
1
, and 
1
for 
1
with top k
1
. From the denition of update, we
know that t
1
:
1
is dened (since w
1
:k
1
is) and u
1
 t
1
:
1
. Furthermore, we have s
1
 !
a
t
1
and 
1
 !
a

1
. Now, because of the given bisimilarities, there exist t
2
and 
2
with s
2
 !
a
t
2
and 
2
 !
a

2
such that t
1
 t
2
and 
1
 
2
. As t
1
:
1
is dened, t
2
:
2
is as well, and so
Duplicator takes as her move the state u
2
which has the same underlying model as s
2
:
2
and
top given by the top of t
2
:
2
. Because of the denition of update we have u
2
 t
2
:
2
. Now
for the bisimilarity of u
1
and u
2
, we can play the same game with t
1
:
1
and t
2
:
2
. As the
game will not nish in this way, Duplicator wins.
2
Now, for an example of two actions which have the same eect, but are not bisimilar
according to the above denition, consider the following two action expressions:
 = (x:x
a
) and  = (x:y:(p? + x
a
+ y
a
)
a
+ (:p? + x
a
+ y
a
)
a
)
Action  describes a skip action, of which agent a is aware. Action  is a skip action, while
a suspects a test for p or for :p, but cannot distinguish between the two. In a picture these
look as follows:
Skip
+
K
a
Skip
+
	
a
R
a
p?
K
a
:p?
K
a
-
a
Clearly, the two action structures are not bisimilar, as the change function of a test for
a proposition letter or its negation is strictly partial, while the change function of Skip is
not, so they are not equal. We will now show for a particular s that the updates with the
respective actions nevertheless do give a bisimilar result. The proof that this holds for any
state we will not give here. Take for s the following state in which p is true, but agent a
cannot distinguish between p being true or not:
p
+
w
0
:p
w
1
-
a
]
a

a
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The result of updating s with  is now straightforward; roughly, as  contains only one
action token, the product with the set of worlds in s is equal to set the worlds in s. As there
is an arrow from the single action token to itself, this allows all the arrows in s to be copied in
the new world. Hence, as expected, nothing changes, so s equals s: (we have only changed
the labels at the worlds as described in the denition of update, using k
0
here as the name
of the action token):
p
+
w
0
; k
0
:p
w
1
; k
0
-
a
]
a

a
For the update of s by  we rst observe that the action token :p? fails in w
0
, as does p? in
w
1
, so the set of new worlds after the update s: is: f(w
0
; k
0
); (w
1
; k
0
); (w
0
; k
1
); (w
1
; k
2
)g (here
we use k
0
for the top token of , k
1
for p? and k
2
for :p?). Furthermore, when calculating
the accessibility relation, we see that there is no arrow to the world (w
1
; k
0
) (because there is
no arrow to the token k
0
in ), and, because that is also not the top token of the new state,
it is totally disconnected, and we may leave it out in the picture. This leads to the following
picture of s::
p
w
0
; k
0
+
	
a
R
a
p
w
0
; k
1

a
:p
w
1
; k
2
]
a
-
a
To see that s: and s: are bisimilar, observe that both tops are p worlds, and that from
each of the worlds in both states there is an arrow to a p world and to a :p world. This
ensures that for a step (or a move, in a game proof) in one of the two states, there is an
equivalent step in the other.
As we can prove this for arbitrary s, we may conclude: there are actions  and , which
are not bisimilar ( 6 ), such that for all bisimilar states s; s
0
they give bisimilar results
(i.e. s  s
0
implies s:  s
0
:).
Fact 5 If two actions  and 
0
give bisimilar results (updates) on bisimilar states, then that
does not guarantee that they are bisimilar: if for all s; s
0
, s  s
0
implies s:  s
0
:
0
, then not
necessarily   
0
.
As we are ultimately interested in what actions actually change in given states, we dene
another relation between action structures, which does have the property that two action
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structures are related if and only if the updates on bisimilar states is bisimilar again. We are
able to dene this relation as a bisimulation relation, using the denition of twin-bisimilarity,
which relates pairs of states and actions.
Denition 6 A pair (s; ) of a state and an action structure is twin-bisimilar with another
such pair (t; ) i:
 hhC

ii(s) = hhC

ii(t), or both hhC

ii(s) and hhC

ii(t) are undened;
 for each s  !
a
s
0
and   !
a

0
there is t  !
a
t
0
and   !
a

0
s.t. (s
0
; 
0
) is
twin-bisimilar to (t
0
; 
0
);
 and vice versa.
From this we can naturally dene the notion of t-bisimulation relations on actions:
Denition 7 Two actions  and 
0
are t-bisimilar i the pairs (s; ) and (s
0
; 
0
) are twin-
bisimilar for all bisimilar states s; s
0
. Notation: ( 
t

0
.)
Lemma 8 Comparing the \normal" bisimilarity with t-bisimilarity, we have the following
observations:
 if   
0
then  
t

0
;
 if s  s
0
and  
t

0
then s:  s
0
:
0
;
 if for all s  s
0
we have that s:  s
0
:
0
, then  
t

0
.
Note that the earlier examples  and  that were not action bisimilar but had the same
update eect are indeed twin bisimilar.
Finally, we are interested in the relation between states that behave the same under update
with a given action . This relation is given by the following denition:
Denition 9 Let s; t be states, and let  be a (pointed) action. s and t are -update bisimilar
(notation s 

t) i
 either C

1
(V
s
1
), C

1
(V
t
1
) both dened, and hhC

1
ii(s) = hhC

1
ii(t), or hhC

1
ii(s) and
hhC

1
ii(t) both undened,
 if s!
a
s
0
and !
a

0
then there is a t
0
with t!
a
t
0
and s
0


0
t
0
, or s
0
:
0
is undened;
 and vice versa.
Lemma 10 For all states s; t, all pointed actions : s 

t i s:  t:.
Proof We will prove for the base case and the coinduction step of both denitions that they
are equivalent. For the base case, note that V
s:
= hhC

ii(s). Hence hhC

ii(s) = hhC

ii(t) i
V
s:
= V
t:
. For the step, note that s:  !
a
s
0
:
0
i s  !
a
s
0
and   !
a

0
and s:; s
0
:
0
dened. Now suppose s:  !
a
s
0
:
0
but there is no t
0
:
0
s.t. t:  !
a
t
0
:
0
. That means,
there is no t  !
a
t
0
s.t. t
0
:
0
 s
0
:
0
. Hence no t  !
a
t
0
s.t. s
0


t
0
, and vice versa.
2
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9. The Sending of a Message as an Action
It is time to focus again on the action of sending messages, possibly encrypted and signed.
We will dene for examples of such actions, that is, for messages m 2 Message, a translation
as an action expression. It will turn out that there are several translation options available.
This is a familiar feature about formalisation of informal notions: the formal rigour imposed
by the description medium acts as an incentive to make up one's mind about the informal
notions.
9.1 Awareness Actions
In the example of Othello, we have seen that Othello is not aware of what action Iago really
suspects (knows) to happen. Othello thinks that Iago | just like himself | suspects nothing,
i.e. Skip. In the picture this is indicated by the i-arrow from Skip to itself, rather than to
the top node. In order to be able to dene fully mutually transparant actions, we now rst
dene an action form where all agents are aware of each other's suspected actions.
We envision the situation where each agent a suspects a command comm
a
to be happening,
possibly dierent from what is really happening, and from what other agents suspect to be
happening. The command comm
top
denotes what is actually happening, that is, what is
applied to the top world of the model. In general, for a group of agents to be aware of each
other's suspicions, we would need arrows from and to each of the actions of the agents. The
picture should look like (or be bisimilar to) a fully connected graph, where the nodes are the
commands comm
a
each agent a suspects, and arrows to the command of a are labelled a. On
top of that there is a top node, with the \real" command comm
top
that is happening in the
top world; this node would only have arrows to all other nodes. For three agents, a; b; c, with
each one command that they suspect, that would look like the action below.
+
comm
top
comm
b
comm
a
comm
c
?
b
?
a
?
c
	
a

b
R
c
I
b

a
-
c
Y
b
K
a
K
c
In this picture, we can walk from the top node over an a-arrow and a c-arrow to comm
c
,
which should be interpreted as \a believes that c believes that comm
c
is happening". Similarly,
one can \see" in the graph statements like \b believes that a believes that b believes that
comm
b
is happening". Note that every node has outgoing arrows to all other nodes (apart
from the top node), labelled by the agent to whose command the arrow leads.
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For expressing this general action structure as an action expression (for any set of agents
Agent and given comm
a
; comm
b
, etc.), we rst recall the intuitive meaning of the -operator as
the introduction of a placeholder. In the recursive denition below we introduce a placeholder
x
a
for every node comm
a
, by keeping track of the agents whose commands do not have a
placeholder yet. The idea s that every action subexpression representing a node in the picture
has a suspicion x
a
a
for all agents a in the range of \their" x
a
operator. For the others, this
must still be introduced. Using a recursive denition, which starts from the set of all agents
Agent, we obtain the denition of what we call aware suspicion. (We use the notation
P
a2A
for the \+" operator on actions.)
Denition 11 The action aware suspicion of a group of agents a that each have one com-
mand comm
a
they suspect to happen, while the command comm
top
takes place in the top node,
is dened as
aware suspicion(comm
top
; (a; comm
a
)
a2Agent
) := act
top
where
act
top
:= comm
top
+
X
a2Agent
(act
a
(Agent))
a
; and, for any set A  Agent :
act
a
(A) := x
a
:comm
a
+
X
b62Anfag
(x
b
)
b
+
X
b2Anfag
(act
b
(A n fag))
b
To improve readability and comprehension of the action expressions, we will restrict our-
selves to the situation where the number of agents is three. The formulas can be extended
to larger numbers of agents.
9.2 Assumptions on Belief and Trust
For the setting of cryptographic communication, we use a type of doxastic models, that is,
models that are suited to reason about belief, rather than knowledge (see [4] on doxastic
logic). Exactly in the case of secret communication, agents may have wrong beliefs about
what is being communicated or about the eects the communication has.
We assume the usual belief axioms D45:
` 3
a
True
` 3
a
3
a
 ! 3
a

` 3
a
 ! 2
a
3
a

These axioms correspond to properties of models and their underlying frames:
Lemma 12 For a given frame F,
 all models on F satisfy axiom D i F is serial;
 all models on F satisfy axiom 4 i F is transitive;
 all models on F satisfy axiom 5 i F is euclidean.
In general, models that satisfy one or more of these axioms need not have an underlying
frame with the corresponding properties, but one can always nd a bisimilar model that does
have such a frame.
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Furthermore, for every pair of agents a; b we have the following axiom for the trust relation,
which we have discussed in Section 3:
` (Trustab $ 2
a
Trustab) ^ (:Trustab $ 2
a
:Trustab)
This axiom states that every agent has right beliefs about her own trust or distrust in other
agents.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to formulate a corresponding frame property for the trust
axiom, but we can formulate the requirements on the models by help of the following deni-
tion. The idea is that if Trustab is true in some world in a model, it should also be true in
all worlds that are a-related to that world, that is, the worlds that a considers possible. And
reversely, if Trustab is false there, it should be false in all of a's possible worlds. We say that
a controls her own trust relations. We dene this property for any proposition letter (recall
that Trustab is among them: Trustab 2 Prop).
Denition 13 For a state s and a proposition letter p 2 Prop, we say that an agent a 2 Agent
controls p in s i for all states t reachable from s, we have that
 p 2 V (t) i for all t
0
such that t  !
a
t
0
, p 2 V (t
0
);
 p 62 V (t) i for all t
0
such that t  !
a
t
0
, p 62 V (t
0
).
For a model W, we say that a controls p in W if a controls p in all states s = (W; w) in the
model.
Note that this must hold also for states that are unreachable by a itself. If you view a model
as a group of (disconnected) \a-clusters" of worlds internally connected by a-arrows, then
the value of p must be the same within each a-cluster, but may dier in dierent a-clusters.
Now we dene the models we need for our analysis of crypto actions:
Denition 14 A model W is a doxastic trust model i
 there exists a bisimilar model that is serial, transitive and euclidean;
 for all pairs of agents a; b 2 Agent, a controls Trustab in W.
For such a W, we call a state (pointed model) s = (W; w) a pointed doxastic trust model or
a doxastic trust state.
For the actions we dene in the following subsections, we will prove that they preserve the
properties as dened here, i.e. the update applied to a (pointed) doxastic trust model will
also return a (pointed) doxastic trust model.
9.3 Sending Signed Formulas with Addressee
As a rst case, let us discuss a possible translation of Sign
a
b
, where  is a formula. This
message is addressed to a, and signed by b, but every agent (also c) can see the contents.
The sending of such a message can be seen as an announcement, and we model it here as
an action during which the following events are happening. Agent a learns  in the worlds
where she trusts b, that is, she learns the implication (Trustab ! ), unless that would
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lead to inconsistency (if in all her possible worlds Trustab and : are true), in which case she
changes her trust in b into distrust. In the mean time, both b and the third agent c change
the Trustab value according to their own beliefs of a's beliefs. At the same time, c (not b)
learns the formula if he can and if he trusts b (so agent c learns the implication Trustcb ! 
if that does not lead to inconsistencies), but c does not change his trust in b if he cannot learn
it (concluding that b may only be untrustworthy to a). All three of the agents are aware of
each other's actions.
This is in fact an aware suspicion action as dened in denition 11. Because b's suspicion
is exactly what happens in the top-world, we can simplify the picture of Section 9.1 to the
following bisimilar variant:
If 2
a
:(Trustab ! )
Then Trustab := 0
+
]
b
	
a

b
j
c
Y
b
If 3
a
(Trustab ! )
Then (Trustab ! )?
Else Trustab := 0
K
a
(If3
c
(Trustcb ! )Then (Trustcb ! )?);
(If 2
a
:(Trustab ! )ThenTrustab := 0)
K
c
-

a
c
Note that the condition 2
a
:(Trustab ! ) is exactly the negation of the condition
3
a
(Trustab ! ), so all if-then-else commands in the above action set Trustab := 0 in all
worlds when the former condition is true and the latter is false. The condition on when the
value of Trustab is changed in the top world should be related to a's belief on the condition of
changing it, because we aim to preserve doxastic trust models (in which a controls Trustab).
We will dicuss this below. Note also that the command in the top token (If 2
a
:(Trustab !
)ThenTrustab := 0) is dened for all states, so for every state, the update with the total
action is dened. The other two tokens contain tests of the form (Trustxb ! )? of which
the updates are undened in states where their test condition is false, hence these tokens may
\delete" some worlds in the update. The condition of the if-statement, however, prevents
that all possible worlds of either a or c would be eliminated: it tests exactly for the presence
of at least one world that would survive this test. We will use this observation below, in the
proof of the well-formedness of the updated model.
In a formula, we can describe the above complex action as follows (for readability, we added
abbreviations for each of the commands in the three dierent action tokens):
(x:comm
b
+ x
b
+
(y:comm
a
+ x
b
+ y
a
+ (z:comm
c
+ x
b
+ y
a
+ z
c
)
c
)
a
+
(z:comm
c
+ x
b
+ z
c
+ (y:comm
a
+ x
b
+ z
c
+ y
a
)
a
)
c
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where
comm
a
:= If 3
a
(Trustab ! )Then (Trustab ! )?Else Trustab := 0
comm
b
:= If 2
a
:(Trustab ! )ThenTrustab := 0
comm
c
:= (If 3
c
(Trustac ! )Then (Trustac ! )?);
(If 2
a
:(Trustab ! )ThenTrustab := 0)
This action expression is equivalent to aware suspicion(comm
b
; (a; comm
a
); (b; comm
b
); (c; comm
c
)).
Lemma 15 The action of sending a signed formula with addressee, as described above, pre-
serves doxastic trust models.
Proof We give the proof here for the case of three agents, but this can be easily extended
to the same result for the extension of the action to a larger number of agents. Let  be
the above dened action of sending a signed formula with addressee. Let s = (W; w
0
) be a
doxastic trust model, without loss of generality we assume that W is serial, transitive and
euclidean and that for all pairs of agents d; d
0
, Trustdd
0
is controlled by d in W. We will
prove that s: is a doxastic trust model as well. Note that the action structure of  is serial,
transitive and euclidean itself (for all three relations  !
a
,  !
b
and  !
c
). Observe that a
given u 2 s: (i.e. a world in the underlying model of the update) must be of the form w:k
for a world w 2W and action token k.
For seriality of s:, let such a w:k be given. As W is serial and  is, we can nd for every
agent d a w
0
d
and k
0
d
s.t. w  !
d
w
0
d
and k  !
d
k
0
d
. For d = b, k
b
is the top-action in 
(comm
b
in the denition), as that is the only action token where all b-arrows point to. As we
observed, it can never fail (its update is dened for every possible state), so w
0
b
:k
0
b
is dened,
and (see denition update) w:k  !
b
w
0
b
:k
0
b
. For d = a, we rst note that k
a
must be comm
a
in the above denition. That action can only fail in state (W; w
0
a
) if the if-then-else condition
(3
a
(Trustab ! )) holds in w
0
a
, but the test doesn't (so :(Trustab ! ) holds). So if
w
0
a
:k
0
a
is undened, there is another world w
00
a
2 W with w
0
a
 !
a
w
00
a
which does satisfy the
test (Trustab ! ). In other words, w
00
a
:k
0
a
is dened. Because W is transitive, we have
w  !
a
w
00
a
as well. So, by denition of the update, we have w:k  !
a
w
00
a
:k
0
a
. A similar
argument works for the case of c.
Transitivity and euclidicity of s: follows directly from transitivity and euclidicity of s and
 themselves.
Now we prove that for all pairs of agents d; d
0
, Trustdd
0
is controlled by d in s:. Suppose
it doesn't hold. Let agents d; d
0
and worlds w:k;w
0
:k
0
reachable from s: be given such that
w:k  !
a
w
0
:k
0
and the value of Trustdd
0
in w:k diers from the value in w
0
:k
0
. Note that
for all action tokens in  it holds that the value of Trustdd
0
only (and exactly) changes if
d = a; d
0
= b and if 2
a
:(Trustab ! ) holds in the original state, in which case the value is
set to 0. So for d; d
0
dierent than that, the values of Trustdd
0
are already dierent before the
action update, in w and w
0
. But this contradicts the assumption that s is a doxastic trust
model. For d = a; d
0
= b, we consider the case that in w it holds that 2
a
:(Trustab ! )
and in w
0
it doesn't (or vice versa). But this contradicts transitivity and euclideanity of s,
which together guarantee that for every world w
00
, w  !
a
w
0
i w
0
 !
a
w. The value of
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Trustab can also not already have been dierent before the update, in s, as that contradicts
the assumption that s is a doxastic trust model. All options lead to contradiction, hence for
all pairs of agents d; d
0
, Trustdd
0
is controlled by d in s:.
2
9.4 Sending Signed Formulas Without Addressee
In our language we also allow for b sending a signed formula, but without specifying an
addressee. The message then looks like Sign
b
. In the modelling of the sending of such
message, we will interpret it here as a message to all agents, so both agents a and c will learn
the implication Trustab !  and Trustcb !  respectively, if they can, or otherwise give
up their trust in b. Again, all agents are aware of what the others do, and update the trust
relations of the other two agents according to their own beliefs about the others' beliefs.
In structure, the action for this is the same as the one for Sign
a
b
 but with dierent com-
mands in the three action tokens:
(x:comm
b
+ x
b
+
(y:comm
a
+ x
b
+ y
a
+ (z:comm
c
+ x
b
+ y
a
+ z
c
)
c
)
a
+
(z:comm
c
+ x
b
+ z
c
+ (y:comm
a
+ x
b
+ z
c
+ y
a
)
a
)
c
where
comm
a
:= (If 3
a
(Trustab ! )Then (Trustab ! )?Else Trustab := 0);
(If 2
c
:(Trustcb ! )ThenTrustcb := 0)
comm
b
:= (If 2
a
:(Trustab ! )ThenTrustab := 0); (If 2
c
:(Trustcb ! )ThenTrustcb := 0)
comm
c
:= (If 3
c
(Trustac ! )Then (Trustac ! )?Else Trustcb := 0);
(If 2
a
:(Trustab ! )ThenTrustab := 0)
In a picture this has the same structure seen before (we now use comm
x
for abbreviating
the commands in the picture).
comm
b
+
]
b
	
a

b
j
c
Y
b
comm
a
K
a
comm
c
K
c
-

a
c
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Again, this action is bisimilar to the action dened by
aware suspicion(comm
b
; (a; comm
a
); (b; comm
b
); (c; comm
c
)):
Lemma 16 The action of sending a signed formula without addressee, as described above,
preserves doxastic trust models.
Proof The proof goes analogous to the proof of Lemma 15. For seriality we observe again
that not all possible worlds of an agent will be deleted, as the test is only performed if there
is at least one world surviving it. The pattern for changing the value of the Trust relation
is the same as in the action mentioned in Lemma 15, and the argument for preserving the
control is likewise. The action is transitive and euclidean, hence those properties are also
preserved in the model.
2
9.5 Sending Encrypted Formulas
Another example of the sending of a message that we can interpret by an action expression
is the sending of an encrypted formula Encr
a
. An example of an interpretation is the action
during which agents who cannot decrypt the message do not know that a message is passing
(one could think of them hearing some background noise which they cannot distinguish from
the passing of an encrypted message), while at the same time the agent a who can decipher
the encrypted formula, cannot see who sent the message, but may learn that formula if she
trusts all others and has at least one possible world in which the formula is true (which would
survive the learning). She is aware of the fact that other agents do not know she receives
something at all.
As other agents do not know that a may learn something, this action is clearly not an
aware suspicion as dened in Denition 11. Note that in the top world nothing changes, only
a's beliefs possibly change. The action expression representing this action for three agents
looks as follows:
(x:comm
a
+ x
a
+ (y:y
a
+ y
b
+ y
c
)
b
+ (y:y
a
+ y
b
+ y
c
)
c
)
a
+
(y:y
a
+ y
b
+ y
c
)
b
+
(y:y
a
+ y
b
+ y
c
)
c
where
comm
a
:= If 3
a
((Trustab ^ Trustac) ! )Then ((Trustab ^ Trustac) ! )?
In a picture, we can represent this as follows:
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Skip
+
	
a
j
b,c
comm
a
K
a
Skip
K
a,b,c
-
b,c
Again, analogously to Lemma 15 we can state that this action preserves the doxastic models
we are using.
Lemma 17 The action of sending an encrypted formula, as described above, preserves dox-
astic trust models.
As we mentioned, this is only one interpretation of what happens when an encrypted
message is sent. If the number of possible messages and the number of agents are both nite,
one could also choose an interpretation where agents suspect that someone got some formula,
and therefore consider all combinations of destined agents and formulas possible.
9.6 Sending Encrypted Signed Formulas
As a last case we consider the sending of an encrypted signed formula Encr
a
Sign
b
. The
dierence with the anonymous encryption is that the recipient now treats signing as she
would if it were just a signed message, but she knows that no-one else is aware of her learning
or trust changing actions.
comm
top
+
(x:comm
a
+ x
a
+ (y:y
a
+ y
b
+ y
c
)
b
+ (y:y
a
+ y
b
+ y
c
)
c
)
a
+
(y:y
a
+ y
b
+ y
c
)
b
+
(y:y
a
+ y
b
+ y
c
)
c
where
comm
a
:= If3
a
(Trustab ! )Then (Trustab ! )?Else Trustab := 0
comm
top
:= If 2
a
:((Trustab ^ Trustac) ! )ThenTrustab := 0
In a picture, we can represent this as follows:
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comm
top
+
	
a
j
b,c
comm
a
K
a
Skip
K
a,b,c
-
b,c
Again, this action preserves the doxastic models we are using.
Lemma 18 The action of sending an encrypted signed formula, as described above, preserves
doxastic trust models.
Similarly we could treat the case of encrypted signatures with addressee as follows: Encr
a
Sign
a
b

we could treat like Encr
a
Sign
b
 (described above), and Encr
a
Sign
c
b
 could be Skip for all agents.
10. Reasoning Principles
In this section, we state a number of sound reasoning principles, which use some new functions
on action expressions.
The Precondition of an Action The function PRE is a function from action expressions to
formulas, such that PRE() represents the precondition of an action  (describing the states
on which it is dened). PRE is dened recursively for action expressions:
PRE :: Action  ! L
PRE(A) :=

True if A consistent
False otherwise.
PRE(If ThenC
1
ElseC
2
) := ( ! PRE(C
1
)) ^ (: ! PRE(C
2
))
PRE(+ ) := PRE ^ PRE
PRE(
a
) := True
PRE( Æ ) := PRE ^ []PRE
PRE(x:(x)) := PRE((x:(x)))
In other words, the precondition of an assignment list is its being consistent (it can update
any state if it is consistent, otherwise it fails on any state), and the precondition of an if-
then-else command can be read as \either  and the precondition of C
1
, or : and the
precondition of C
2
". Recall that our `+'-operator is in fact a sort of parallel composition, so
the precondition of + is the conjunction of the preconditions of  and . For suspicion we
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do not need any precondition (as it refers to what an agent suspects happening in her own
possible worlds, not in the current one). Unsurprisingly, the precondition of the sequential
composition of  and  is dened as the conjunction of the precondition of  and the formula
denoting that \after , the precondition of  holds". The precondition of a -expression may
look as a circular denition, but it is not: recall from the denition of action expressions that
the  variable x is only to be used in the form x
a
, that is, under a suspicion operator. As
PRE(x
a
) is dened as True, the recursion stops before reaching the x again.
The Change After an Action We dene a function CH which gives for every proposition
letter p and action  a formula which represents the value of p after .
CH :: Prop  ! (Action  ! L)
CH
p
(A) :=
8
<
:
True if p 2 A
+
n A
 
False if p 2 A
 
n A
+
p otherwise.
CH
p
(If ThenC
1
ElseC
2
) := ( ! CH
p
(C
1
)) ^ (: ! CH
p
(C
2
))
CH
p
() := CH
p
(topcomm()) for other actions 
So, the changed value of p after assignment list A is True if A sets p to True (and not to False
as well); and it is False if A sets it to False (and not to True). Otherwise it keeps the current
value p. In fact, in case p 2 A
+
\A
 
, A is inconsistent, and the update with A is undened
for any state. In particular, the value of p after the action is undened. Nevertheless, we
choose to dene the change to p here, in order to always have a dened formula. In our
principles we will take care of the undened case by using the PRE function.
Suspicions of Agents during an Action The function SUSP gives for an agent and a given
action expression all subexpressions which that agent considers possible, in other words: all
suspicions of that agent.
SUSP :: Agent  ! (Action  ! P(Action))
SUSP
a
(C) := ;
SUSP
a
(
a
) := fg
SUSP
a
(
b
) := ; for a 6= b
SUSP
a
(+ ) := SUSP
a
 [ SUSP
a

SUSP
a
( Æ ) := f
0
Æ 
0
j 
0
2 SUSP
a
; 
0
2 SUSP
a
g
SUSP
a
(x:(x)) := SUSP
a
(x:(x))
Again, note that the denition on -expressions is not circular, as variables x can only
occur under suspicion operators, and the suspicion case is a base case (non-recursive case) in
our denition. Hence, the  expression may occur in the subexpressions of the nal function
result, but the SUSP function is not called again on them.
Note also that the result of the function is always a set of subexpressions of the given action
expression, and this set is (therefore) always nite.
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Axioms for Actions Using the above (syntactical) functions, we now state axioms about
actions for our logic, which can be treated as sound reasoning principles. In fact, apart from
the rst and the last one, they give equivalences of formulas of the form [], by induction
on .
` []( !  ) ! ([] ! [] )
` []False $ :PRE()
` []p $ (PRE() ! CH
p
())
` []: $ (PRE() ! :[])
` []( ^  ) $ ([] ^ [] )
` []( !  ) $ (PRE() ! ([] ! [] )
` []2
a
 $ (PRE() !
V
2SUSP
a
()
2
a
[])
` [][] $ [ Æ ]
` :PRE() ! []
The rst principle expresses the well-known normality rule (K-axiom) for all modal logics:
the distribution of the []-modality over implication. The second principle expresses the
partial functionality of the []-modality: if the precondition of an action does not hold, then
(and exactly then) \anything" holds after that action. So, updating with an action is a partial
function. In almost all other principles, the PRE() plays a similar role: for example []p
is equivalent to the changed value of p after  | if PRE() holds. We call this the atomic
change principle. In conjunctions after actions, the condition on PRE() is not needed, as
both [] ^ [] and []( ^  ) follow from :PRE(). The knowledge rule deserves special
attention: it says that a will be convinced of  after  has taken place ([]2
a
) exactly when
a now already knows that  would hold after all its suspected actions (the (nite) conjunction
of 2
a
[], where  ranges over suspicions of a) | or PRE() does not hold at all. Here it
is important that the SUSP function indeed returns a nite set of action expressions. When
using this as a rewriting system for a completeness proof (which we will not discuss in this
paper), it is also important that the 's are subexpressions, so that the process stops after
nitely many steps. Expressions of the form [][] (\after  it holds that  holds after ")
are simply equivalent to [ Æ ] (\ holds after  Æ "). Finally, the last principle gives
another formulation of partial functionality.
Axioms for Belief and Model Properties In our applications, we are typically interested in
beliefs of agents with standard properties. For our doxastic logic, we wish to use the usual
belief axioms D45, which express consistency in belief (no belief in False) and positive and
negative introspection:
` 3
a
True
` 3
a
3
a
 ! 3
a

` 3
a
 ! 2
a
3
a

As is well-known from modal theory, these axioms correspond to properties of models and
their underlying frames (a frame being the model structure without the particular valuations
yet):
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Fact 19 For a given frame F,
 all models on F satisfy axiom D i F is serial;
 all models on F satisfy axiom 4 i F is transitive;
 all models on F satisfy axiom 5 i F is euclidean.
In general, models that satisfy one or more of these axioms need not have an underlying
frame with the corresponding properties, but one can always nd a bisimilar model that does
have such a frame. We refer to such models as D45 models.
It is not suÆcient to adopt these axioms in our dynamic doxastic logic, as we could construct
actions such that after the action the axioms do not hold anymore, so those actions do not
preserve D45-models. For example, []2
a
False can be achieved by choosing an  which does
not contain any suspicions for a. It is beyond the scope of this paper to nd suÆcient and
necessary conditions on action expressions for them to preserve D45 models, but the actions
discussed in the examples do preserve them.
Principles for Crypto Communications We now sum up some reasoning principles which
could apply to the particular case of actions that describe the passing of messages. As for the
actions we have dened in Section 9, and for their extensions to a larger number of agents,
we could think of the following rules:
(Trustab ^3
a
) ! ([Sign
a
b
]2
a
)
Trustab ! (3
a
 ! [Sign
b
]2
a
)
[Sign
a
b
]:Trustab $ (2
a
: _ :Trustab)
[Sign
b
]:Trustab $ (2
a
: _ :Trustab)
(2
a
: _ :Trustab) ! 2
a
p $ 2
a
[Sign
b
]p (for p 6= Trustab)
[m]Trustab ! Trustab
:Trustab ! [m]:Trustab
:Trustab ! ([Encr
a
Sign
b
] $  )
[Encr
b
m]2
a
p $ 2
a
p (for a 6= b)
[Encr
a
Sign
b
]2
a
p $ 2
a
[Sign
a
b
]p
These principles reect the way we have dened eects of messages, e.g. of a trusted agent
one will learn statements if possible; if there is no trust after a message from an agent, then
either there was not trust before, or trust was lost because the message was contradicting
all possible worlds; if there is no trust or the statement is contradictory, then afterwards no
facts of the world have changed (apart from the trust fact itself); trust can only be lost, not
gained; agents who cannot decrypt a message do not learn anything from it; agents who can
decrypt a signed message will learn from it exactly like they would learn from it if it were
unencrypted and addressed to them.
These principles are just examples of rules that one may want to reason with. The principles
can be proven with the semantical framework for action expressions that we have given.
Analysing the properties of such actions is a way of analysing the security of communicated
messages.
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11. Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a language for epistemic action and change together with
its formal semantics. The actions are considered as structures which, analogous to Kripke
structures for static knowledge, represent beliefs about actions happening. The actions can
be epistemic actions (in which case they show something about the world) or change actions,
in which case they change the world, that is, the value of some of the proposition letters.
With this framework it is possible to describe many examples of actions and the change of
knowledge they involve. We have developed notions of bisimulation that show equivalences
between the results of actions.
In general, we focused on the actions of sending signed or encrypted messages. For this, we
introduced the notion of a doxastic trust model, which guarantees certain properties regarding
trust between agents. We gave denitions of possible interpretations of the learning that is
triggered by the sending of such messages, and showed that they preserved the properties of
a doxastic trust model. Finally, we have given some sound principles of reasoning, and some
conclusions on the particular interpretations of encrypted and signed messages earlier.
What still remains to be done is the development of a reasoning system in which the
principles of Section 10 hold, together with a proof of completeness. Furthermore it will be
interesting to explore other cases and settings of cryptographic communication. For that,
it may be necessary to distinguish more between representation of the actual receiving of a
message and that of its interpretation by the receiving agent.
Another line of future work lies in the direction of probability analysis: both state models
and action models could be expanded in a straightforward way to probabilistic models. They
could be used as models for a language in which one could express e.g. chances of breaking
a cryptographic key, and the epistemics that would induce.
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